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1603 eta 1707 artean eskoziarrek Ingalaterrarekiko batasuna nola negoziatu zuten jasoko 
da kapitulu honetan. Eskoziarrek britainiar monarkian eduki nahi zuten lekua eta napoliarrek 
Espainiako monarkian zutena erkatuko dira. Napoliarrek independent zia gehiago nahi zuten, 
eskoziarrek, aldiz, batasun handiagoa. Eskoziarrek Ingalaterran “sart zea” adostu zuten, batasun 
“konfederala”ren ordez, baina bi kont zesio garrant zit su lortu zituzten: Batasuna “itun” gisa jaso 
zen, eta herriak “erabilt zeko” sortu zen. Britainia Handiko Parlamentu berria subiranoa izango zen, 
baina eskoziarrent zat Batasuna baldint zapekoa zen.
Gilt za-Hit zak: Eskozia. Espainiako monarkia. Napoliarrak. Andrew Fletcher. Konfederazioa. 
Inkorporazioa. Monarkia unibert sala. Feudalismoa.
Este capítulo explora los términos en los que los escoceses debatieron la unión con Inglaterra 
entre 1603 y 1707. Se compara el lugar que los escoceses consideraban ocupar en la monarquía 
británica con el de los napolitanos en la española. Mientras los napolitanos deseaban una 
mayor independencia, los escoceses apuntaban a una mayor unión. Los escoceses acordaron 
“incorporarse” a Inglaterra en lugar de optar por una unión “confederal”, pero con dos logros 
importantes: la Unión se consideraba un “tratado” y su justificación era la “utilidad” del pueblo. 
El nuevo Parlamento de Gran Bretaña sería soberano, pero los escoceses continuaban viendo la 
Unión como condicionada.
Palabras Clave: Escocia. Monarquía española. Nápoles. Andrew Fletcher. Confederación. 
Incorporación. Monarquía universal. Feudalismo.
Ce chapitre explore les termes de l’union avec l’Angleterre négociée par les Écossais entre 
1603 et 1707, en comparant la place que les Écossais prétendaient occuper dans la monarchie 
britannique avec celle des Napolitains dans la monarchie espagnole. Alors que les Napolitains 
prétendaient obtenir une plus grande indépendance, les Écossais visaient une plus grande union. 
Les Écossais ont ainsi choisi de s’ « incorporer » à l’Angleterre au lieu d’opter pour une union 
« confédérale », mais avec deux concessions importantes : l’Union était considérée comme un 
« Traité » et elle se justifiait par son « utilité » pour le peuple. Le nouveau Parlement de Grande 
Bretagne serait souverain, mais les Écossais continueraient à voir l’Union comme conditionnelle. 
Mot s Clé : Écosse. Monarchie espagnole. Naples. Andrew Fletcher. Confédération. 
Incorporation. Monarchie universelle. Féodalisme.
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From one end of the seventeenth century to the other, the Spanish 
Monarchy was a favoured reference point for those discussing the Anglo-
Scottish union. In 1607, in an effort to explain the apparent reluctance of 
the Scot s to enter a closer union with England, King James VI of Scotland 
and I of England told the English Parliament that the Scot s feared to become 
‘a naked province, without law or liberty under this kingdom’. Accordingly, 
he continued, ‘I hope you mean not that I should set garrisons over them, 
as the Spaniards do over Sicily and Naples, or govern them by commission-
ers, which are seldom found succeedingly all wise and honest men’1. In a 
much quoted passage, James added that it was quite unnecessary to govern 
Scotland in this manner, because 
This I must say for Scotland, and I may truly vaunt it; here I sit and govern it 
with my pen. I write and it is done, and by a clerk of the Council I govern Scotland 
now which others could not do by the sword2.
It was a boast of which Philip II might have been proud. But James’s 
point was that he could rule Scotland without the intermediaries, and the 
soldiers, which his Spanish counterpart required to keep Naples and Sicily in 
subjection.
Later in the same year James’s words were echoed by the Scottish parlia-
ment, which assured him that
We never meant thereby to except against any counfounding… of those 
two before separated kingdoms in one glorious monarchy and empire of the 
whole isle, but only that this your Majesty’s ancient and native kingdom should 
not be so disordered and made confused by turning of it, in place of a true and 
friendly union, into a conquered and slavish province, to be governed by a Viceroy 
or Deputy, like such of the King of Spain’s provinces as your Majesty in your 
Highness’s speech made mention of3.
James was to remain partial to the comparison with Naples. Almost ten 
years later, in 1616, he explained to Star Chamber why he would limit new 
building in the suburbs of London:
It is the fashion of Italy, and especially of Naples, that all the gentry dwell in 
the principal towns, and so the whole country is empty: even so now in England, 
all the country is gotten into London; so as with time, England will be only London, 
and the whole country be left waste4.
1. ‘A Speech to Both the Houses of Parliament, Delivered in the Great Chamber at White-Hall, 
the last day of March 1607’, In: McILWAIN, C.H. (ed.), The Political Works of James I, Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University, 1918, repr. New York, 1965; pp. 300-301. Spelling in this and subse-
quent quotations has been modernised. James meant that it was very rare to find a succession of 
‘wise and honest’ commissioners or viceroys.
2. Ibíd.; p. 301.
3. Letter from the Estates of the Scottish Parliament of 1607 to his Majesty, Register of the 
Privy council of Scotland, Vol. VII 1604-1607, Edinburgh: 1885; pp. 535-6.
4. ‘A Speech in the Starre-Chamber, the xxth of June, 1616’, in McILWAIN (ed.). Political 
Works of James I; p. 343.
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The remark followed a wistful expression of regret that his earlier 
attempt s to unite Scotland and England more closely had been misunder-
stood, suggesting that it may have been the memory of that proposal which 
brought the Neapolitan comparison to mind again.
Not all contributors to the Jacobean Union debate shared the king’s view 
of the Spanish Monarchy as the anti-model for Anglo-Scottish Union. The 
great Scottish jurist, Sir Thomas Craig, believed that Spain had achieved her 
present position of greatness in Europe as a result of a succession of care-
fully constructed dynastic unions. By these means Spanish kings had fash-
ioned an imperium which provided security for their subject s while awing their 
neighbours. The recent union of Scotland and England, he believed, had the 
power to make Britain as formidable as that Hispanicum imperium5.
The Spanish Monarchy was once again a reference point for Scottish 
commentators at the end of the seventeenth century, when Andrew Fletcher 
published his Discorso delle cose di Spagna; scritto nel mese di Luglio 1698. 
Born in 1653, Fletcher had led a turbulent life as a political opponent of both 
Charles II and James II; for several years before 1688 he had been in exile 
in the Netherlands. Even after the Revolution and the accession of William 
and Mary he remained suspicious of royal ambition, and in 1697 he had 
published an eloquent historical critique of standing armies6. The Discorso 
delle cose di Spagna was apparently written by Fletcher in Italian (no English 
original exist s), and was printed with ‘Napoli’ as it s place of publication, 
even though it was almost certainly printed under Fletcher’s direction in 
Edinburgh7. The tract began with an acute analysis of the causes of Spain’s 
decline in the seventeenth century. This Fletcher attributed to the draining of 
it s population as a result of religious intolerance and the insatiable demands 
of the Indies for manpower. But Spain still possessed the advantages of it s 
situation: were population decline arrested, agriculture, industry and com-
merce might once again flourish. What the monarchy needed was a new 
prince –‘un prencipe nuovo’– with a programme of reform to reconstitute 
–‘riordinare’– it s affairs and create good orders, ‘buoni ordini’. The impending 
crisis of the Spanish Succession, Fletcher continued, should provide an ideal 
opportunity to find such a prince and restore the power of the Monarchy. 
Fletcher proceeded to review the various possible candidates for the succes-
5. CRAIG, Sir Thomas. De Unione Regnorum Britanniae Tractatus, ed. C. Sanford Terry, Edin-
burgh: Scottish History Society, vol. LX, 1909; pp. 38-42, 258-62.
6. On Fletcher’s life, ROBERT SON, John. ‘Fletcher, Andrew’, in Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, ed. H. C. G. Matthew and B.H. Harrison, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. For 
his A Discourse concerning Militias and Standing Armies, London: 1697, 2nd ed. A Discourse of 
Government with relation to Militias, Edinburgh: 1698: Andrew Fletcher: Political Works, ed. John 
Robert son, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; pp. 1-31. 
7. The Discorso was first published as a separate pamphlet in 1698, and reprinted in The 
Political Works of Andrew Fletcher, Esq., London, 1732. An English translation by John Robert son 
is included in his edition of Andrew Fletcher: Political Works; pp. 83-117. The best discussion of it s 
bibliography is by SCOTT MACFIE, R. A. ‘A bibliography of Andrew Fletcher of Saltoun’, Publications 
of the Edinburgh Bibliographical Society, Vol. IV, 1901; pp. 117-18. 
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sion, and the territorial exchanges required both to consolidate the monarchy 
and to win the acquiescence of other European rulers. Skilfully handled, such 
a combination of reform and exchange of territory would shortly enable the 
new ruler of Spain to aspire once again to ‘universal monarchy’, without the 
rest of Europe being aware of the danger.
The Discorso was a curious work, heavily ironic in intent, yet rich in 
allusion. It belongs with the growing body of late seventeenth-century com-
mentary on the decline of Spain. But what makes it stand out are two barely 
concealed references. One is to the work of Machiavelli, the greatest single 
inspiration of Fletcher’s political thinking. The language of the ‘prencipe 
nuovo’, of ‘riordinare’ and of ‘buoni ordini’ was classically Machiavellian. The 
other is to Tommaso Campanella, the great Neapolitan rebel and theorist of 
Spanish universal monarchy, whose De Monarchia Hispanica (1640) was in 
Fletcher’s library. Here the allusion lies in the pretended place of publication, 
‘Napoli’, coupled with the argument on behalf of a Spanish universal monar-
chy. Moreover, although the British kingdoms were beyond the scope of the 
Discorso, it seems clear that Fletcher’s irony was indirectly aimed at their 
situation; once more we may see a Scot taking Naples as a vantage-point 
for a comparison between the Spanish and British monarchies. Fletcher pub-
lished the work just as Scottish ships set sail for Darien, on the Isthmus of 
Panama, where the Scot s hoped to plant a colony on Spanish territory. In this 
setting, the Discorso might well be read as suggesting that smaller, depend-
ent kingdoms, such as those of Naples or Scotland, should themselves take 
advantage of the Spanish Succession crisis to avoid once again being swal-
lowed up by the great monarchies of Europe8.
The use of Naples as a comparative vantage-point from which to view 
the position of Scotland can be taken still further, if we look at look at the 
broader pattern and language of debate in the two kingdoms in the years 
around 1700, the years of the Spanish Succession crisis. For it was not only 
the Neapolitans whose future was threatened by dynastic failure. In Britain 
too it was becoming clear that the ruling queen, Queen Anne, was unlikely to 
have surviving heirs (in her case because all her many children died young). 
In that case the British kingdoms were faced, either with a return of the 
exiled, proscribed Stuart s, in the person of James III, or with finding them-
selves a new ruling dynasty. For the majority of the Protestant ruling class, 
in Scotland no less than England, the latter was the only feasible option. 
Though there was a sizeable minority of Jacobites in Scotland, the Protestant 
nobility and lesser landowners, backed by townsmen, lawyers and the clergy 
of the Church of Scotland, were determined not to throw away the gains 
of the Revolution of 1688-899. But this did not mean that the Scot s would 
8. ARMITAGE, David, ‘The Scottish vision of empire: intellectual origins of the Darien venture’, 
in ROBERT SON, John, (ed.), A Union for Empire. Political thought and the Union of 1707, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995; pp. 107-9. 
9. The strength of this sentiment is the dominant theme of the new study by WHATLEY, 
Christopher A., with PATRICK, Derek J., The Scot s and the Union, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2006. 
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automatically do England’s bidding in the matter of a successor dynasty. 
Anticipating Anne’s predicament, the English Parliament voted the Act of 
Settlement (1701), which bestowed the succession on Sophia of Hanover 
and her heirs, by right of their descent from a daughter of James I. The Act 
covered the succession to the Irish as well as the English throne; though it 
could say nothing about Scotland, it strongly implied that the Scot s should 
follow suit. The Scot s, however, saw an opportunity to extract terms for their 
acceptance of the Hanoverian succession.
The need to do so was reinforced by the coincidence of an economic 
crisis. Between 1695 and 1698 there had been a succession of harvest 
failures, followed in 1700 by the definitive collapse of the Darien venture, 
despite the dispatch of a second expedition to the colony in 1699. The 
impact of these was all the more adverse because the Scottish ruling elite 
had previously devoted both political and financial capital to the cause 
of national economic development, establishing a committee of the Privy 
Council specifically for trade, and investing heavily not only in the Darien 
venture, but in the Newmills cloth manufactory and the Bank of Scotland. The 
merchant elites in the towns had likewise shown willing to invest, in a vain 
attempt to offset the increasing pressure on their historic trade with France, 
the Netherlands, and the Baltic. The English could hardly be blamed for all of 
these failures, but the absence of naval protection for Scottish shipping, and 
the hostility of English merchant s and government ministers to the Darien 
venture were obvious sources of grievance10.
The opportunity to voice these grievances came with the calling of a new 
Scottish parliament in May 1703, following the accession of Anne as Queen 
in 1702. For the Queen’s ministers, the priority was to secure Scottish 
assent to the Hanoverian succession. They were made to wait. In a series 
of carefully-crafted speeches, supplemented by further pamphlet s, Andrew 
Fletcher diagnosed the full extent of the crisis, and set out the terms on 
which the Scot s should agree to a new union of the crowns with England. 
The existing Union of the Crowns, he argued, had reduced Scotland, in the 
eyes of the rest of the world, to a condition ‘more like a conquered province, 
than a free independent people’11. His diagnosis of Scotland’s condition as 
a ‘province’ carried a clear implication of dependence –but he did not sim-
ply blame this on England and the English. Rather, he argued, Scotland’s 
present dependence had two underlying causes. The first was the power 
which the great feudal nobility exercised over their inferiors in rural Scotland, 
and the resulting poverty of Scottish agriculture, which in turn left the nobil-
ity dependent on financial hand-out s from the crown’s ministers in England. 
10. SMOUT, T.C. Scottish Trade on the Eve of the Union, Edinburgh and London: 1963; WHAT-
LEY, Christopher A. ‘Taking stock: Scotland at the end of the Seventeenth Century’, in SMOUT, 
T.C. (ed.). Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900, Oxford: Oxford University Press for the Brit-
ish Academy, 2005; pp. 103-25.
11. FLETCHER, Andrew. Speeches by a Member of the Parliament which began at Edinburgh the 
6th of May, 1703, Edinburgh: 1703, in Andrew Fletcher: Political Works, ed. Robert son; p. 133. 
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In other words, the Scottish nobility was politically dependent on England 
because of the backwardness of Scottish agriculture, which in turn was due 
to the oppressive manner in which the nobility treated the common people12. 
The second fundamental cause of Scottish dependence was the omnivorous 
economic appetite of London, which Fletcher believed was draining all the 
outlying kingdoms of the monarchy, and even the rest of England, of their 
wealth and population. The immediate source of this analysis was the work 
of the Anglo-Irish economic writer, Sir William Petty, but the essential critique 
was that voiced by King James in 1616, when he denounced the fatal attrac-
tion which a great capital city exercised over the provinces. (Fletcher even 
followed James in saying one thing, and doing another: like the king, he much 
preferred staying in London to living in his own country)13.
Fletcher’s remedies for the dependent, ‘provincial’ condition of Scotland 
were a combination of agrarian reform, commercial development (he himself 
was a Darien investor), and a re-ordering of the existing Union of the Crowns 
by placing strict ‘Limitations’ on the power of Anne’s successors. Individually, 
none of his proposals attracted sufficient support to be carried. His specific 
suggestions that land be redistributed to smaller proprietors who would cul-
tivate it directly, while the poor were subjected to a form of bonded labour 
(which he made the mistake of likening to ancient slavery), were regarded as 
both draconian and impractical. As we shall see, his proposed ‘Limitations’ 
tapped into a longer tradition of Scottish thinking about union, and therefore 
had more appeal, even if by 1705 ministers had succeeded in securing their 
rejection. Fletcher’s real achievement, however, was to have set the terms 
for the debate which occurred in Scotland after 1698, and was at it s most 
intense between 1703 and 1707, when a new Union was finally agreed. 
There was widespread agreement with his diagnosis of both the social and 
the political predicament of Scotland, and a shared conviction that renegotia-
tion of the terms of the existing union with England was essential. 
If we now turn back to Fletcher’s comparative vantage-point, the kingdom 
and city of Naples, we can see that a strikingly similar debate took place 
there over the same period, between c. 1697 and 1710. The protagonist s 
were of course different: in 1700 Philip Bourbon, grandson of Louis XIV, suc-
ceeded to the thrones of the Spanish Monarchy, including that of Naples, as 
Philip V. He was almost immediately greeted by a conspiracy, the Congiura 
di Macchia, in favour of the Austrian candidate to the Spanish thrones; and 
although that was put down, Austrian forces under Archduke Charles success-
fully annexed the kingdom for the Habsburgs in 1707, ending over two hun-
12. FLETCHER, Speeches, in Political Works; pp. 133-4; and his earlier pamphlet on the eco-
nomic and social condition of Scotland, Two Discourses concerning the Affairs of Scotland, written 
in 1698, Edinburgh: 1698, in Political Works; pp. 33-81.
13. For the analysis of the attractive power of London: FLETCHER, Andrew. An Account of a 
Conversation Concerning a Right Regulation of Government s for the common Good of Mankind, 
Edinburgh, 1704, in Political Works; pp. 175-215, esp. 177-81, 198-215; comment on Petty; p. 
199, n. 26. On Fletcher’s taste for London, and other great capitals, see my ‘Introduction’, Political 
Works; pp. xii-xv, xxvii-xxviii.
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dred years of Spanish rule. Not only the protagonist s, but the geographical 
and economic circumstances, institutions, and constitutional language of the 
Mediterranean kingdom were all very different from those of Scotland. Even 
allowing for these differences, however, the terms of the debate in Naples 
bear comparison with those found in Scotland14.
There too the threat of ‘universal monarchy’ and reduction to the status 
of a ‘province’ provided the framework in which the prospect s of the kingdom 
were discussed. Canvassing the alternative Bourbon and Habsburg claims to 
the throne in a manuscript tract of 1697, the jurist Francesco D’Andrea cau-
tiously suggested that an Austrian succession would create a monarchy less 
dangerously ambitious than one linked to the France of Louis XIV15. Those 
who acted on this suggestion, the Macchia conspirators, in turn justified their 
actions with the claim that their objective was ‘di liberare il Regno dalla non 
meno ignominiosa, che miserabil condizione di Provincia’16. Defenders of 
the Bourbon monarchy countered that the accusation of universal monarchy 
levelled at Louis XIV was a specious pretext, and that French support offered 
the best prospect of defending Neapolitan commerce from subordination to 
Dutch and English interest s17.
Not surprisingly, it was the former analysis which prevailed after the 
Austrian capture of the kingdom in 1707. In 1709 a leading official of the 
new regime, Gennaro D’Andrea, commissioned a lengthy ‘Relazione dello 
stato politico, economico e civile del Regno di Napoli nel tempo ch’è stato 
governato da i Spagnuoli’, more simply known as the ‘Massime del governo 
spagnolo a Napoli’. The author of the work was Paolo Mattia Doria, a 
Genoese man of letters who had settled in Naples in the 1690s. In his intel-
ligence as well as the debt he too owed to Machiavelli, Doria bears striking 
resemblance to Andrew Fletcher. Adding a new term to the Machiavellian 
lexicon, Doria characterised Naples as ‘un regno governato in provincia’. 
The concept described the technique of ruling an acquired kingdom by the 
methods of divide and rule. Doria argued that the Spanish had used two 
policies in particular to rule Naples as a ‘province’. They had made constant 
concessions to the feudal nobility, granting them powers of jurisdiction which 
14. For an extended comparison, ROBERT SON, John. The Case for the Enlightenment. Scot-
land and Naples 1680-1760, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; pp. 147-200: Ch. 4 
The predicament of ‘kingdoms governed as provinces’.
15. D’ANDREA, Francesco. ‘Discorso politico intorno alla future successione della monarchia 
di Spagna’ (1697-98), in MASTELLONE, Salvo. Francesco D’Andrea politico e giurista 1648-1698. 
L’acesa del ceto civile, Florence: Olschki, 1969; pp. 183-99.
16. ‘Copia di lettera scritta da D. Bartolomeo Ceva Grimaldi Duca di telese ad un suo amico a 
Napoli, Vienna, 1701’, Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, Ms XXVII.c.10 ff. 121-131, quotation 
at ff. 124r-v. See also ‘Discorso interno alla successione della Monarchia di Spagna dopo la morte 
de Carlo II, del Consiglier Conte Saverio Pansuti’, Biblioteca Nazionale di Napoli, Ms. X.F.72 ff. 
1-44.
17. ‘Riflessioni sopra li differenti interessi che la maggior parte delle potenze di Europa han-
no nel presente stato della monarchia di Spagna’, Società Napoletana di Storia Patria, Ms. XXVI.
D.10 ff. 728-55.
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only made them more independent of the crown. At the same time, they had 
allowed the city of Naples to grow at the expense of the rest of the kingdom, 
by concentrating in it the magistracies, court s and institutions of education, 
and with them most of the kingdom’s industry and commerce18. Here too, 
in other words, the fundamental causes of provincial dependence were an 
over-mighty feudal nobility and an over-blown, out size capital city. Doria’s 
remedies were correspondingly similar to Fletcher’s. As in Scotland, agrarian 
reform, commercial development and a new political framework were needed 
to assure the flourishing of the kingdom of Naples.
At this point, however, a clear divergence between the cases of Scotland 
and Naples opens up. Whatever the similarities between the social and 
economic diagnoses offered by Fletcher and Doria, their constitutional and 
political expectations were markedly different. What the Neapolitans sought 
from the Spanish Succession crisis was greater autonomy, if not actual 
independence. Francesco D’Andrea’s doubt s about a Bourbon succession 
had reflected a fear that the advent of a Spanish monarchy closely allied to 
France would reduce the autonomy which the Neapolitan noble and civilian 
elites had enjoyed since the failure of the Masaniello revolt of 1647-48. More 
positively, both the ‘Austracistas’ of the Macchia Conspiracy and Doria clearly 
expected the Austrian Habsburgs to offer more autonomy than their Spanish 
predecessors. By this they had in mind two things in particular. First, the gov-
erning and magisterial offices of the kingdom should be reserved for ‘regni-
coli’, Neapolitans, and particularly for the class of ‘togati’, the jurist s or men 
of the robe, who had grown accustomed to ruling through their membership of 
the Viceregal councils and the main tribunals of the city. Second, the Austrian 
Viceroys were expected to stand up to Rome, and to defend the autonomy of 
the kingdom from the Papacy, preventing the latter from renewing it s historic 
claims to feudal suzerainty, and from interfering in every aspect of ecclesias-
tical and even civil affairs19. The jurist s’ campaign to stiffen the kingdom’s 
defences against Rome culminated in the publication, in 1723, of Pietro 
Giannone’s great Storia civile del Regno di Napoli, which discredited the Papal 
claim to feudal overlordship, and documented the repeated encroachment s 
of the church on the civil power. But the fate of the work marked the limit s 
of Neapolitan autonomy under the Austrians; the Viceroy was unable to pre-
vent it s condemnation or to save Giannone from being driven into exile. In 
the event, of course, the Neapolitans were liberated from Austrian rule even 
more suddenly and unexpectedly than they had been subjected to it. In 1734 
the kingdom was conquered anew by Carlo Borbone, son of Philip V by his 
second wife, Elizabetta Farnese, and thus restored to independence. Having 
told themselves that independence was the key to prosperity and reform, the 
Neapolitans now had to live with the burden of that expectation for well over 
a hundred years. 
18. DORIA, Paolo Mattia. Massime del governo spagnolo a Napoli, eds. Giuseppe Galasso and 
Vittorio Conti, Naples: Guida, 1973.
19. RICUPERATI, Giuseppe. ‘Alessandro Riccardi e le richieste del “ceto civile” all’Austria nel 
1707’, Rivista Storica Italiana, 81, 1969; pp. 745-77.
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While the Neapolitans sought greater autonomy –and eventually gained inde-
pendence– as a kingdom, the Scot s, in contrast, were seeking no more than a 
better form of union with their more powerful neighbour kingdom, England. 
No one in Scotland in the 1700s was seriously seeking independence; even 
Jacobite supporters of the Old Pretender, James III, knew that he would seek 
restoration to all three of his kingdoms, and thus a renewal of the Union of 
the Crowns. The historic integrity and independence of the Scottish crown had 
indeed to be defended against the mischievous claims of English antiquarians 
that medieval Scottish kings had done homage to their English counterpart s; 
historians who refuted the English antiquarians were duly rewarded by the 
Scottish parliament20. But no attempt was made to predicate Scotland’s future 
on a recovery of it s independence. Instead between 1703 and 1707 the Scot s 
resumed and brought to a conclusion the debate over the best form of union on 
which they had been engaged ever since it had been initiated by James VI and 
I. The debate had by no means been continuous, occurring in fit s and start s as 
necessity required or opportunity arose. But after 1603 the Scot s did think, as 
the Neapolitans would rather not, in terms of forms of union.
At first there had been general agreement that this should come by mak-
ing the Union of the Crowns more equal, by protecting Scotland in particular 
from abuse of power by the court and the king’s ministers in London. If 
even James VI had occasionally shown signs of arbitrariness at the Scot s’ 
expense, his son Charles I gave much stronger cause for concern, most 
dangerously in his support for Anglican forms of worship and ecclesiastical 
authority in the 1630s. When the opportunity arose in 1641 therefore, the 
Scot s had taken it: seizing on Charles’s difficulties with the parliament of 
England, the Scottish parliament passed a series of act s limiting the king’s 
powers within the kingdom. Two years later, Charles’ worsening position 
in both England and Ireland gave the Scot s a further opportunity, this time 
to secure the limitations on royal power through a new form of union with 
England. Under the Solemn League and Covenant (1643), the two parlia-
ment s agreed to adopt the Presbyterian form of church government in both 
kingdoms, as a guarantee of their political equality and co-operation. Framed 
as a new covenant with God himself, this union acquired a status in Scot s’ 
eyes out of all proportion to it s acceptability in England. When in 1649 the 
English parliament and army repudiated the covenant, executed the king, 
and abolished the monarchy in England and Ireland, the Scot s refused the 
independence which the English republicans were happy –indeed keen– for 
them to resume, and went back to war with England, in the cause of Anglo-
Scottish union. They proclaimed Charles II king of England and Ireland as well 
as Scotland, and set out to restore the Union of the Crowns along with the 
Solemn League and Covenant21.
20. FERGUSON, William. ‘Imperial crowns: a neglected facet of the background to the Treaty 
of Union’, Scottish Historical Review, 53, (1974); pp. 22-44; KIDD, Colin, Subverting Scotland’s 
Past. Scottish Whig historians and the Creation of an Anglo-British Identity, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993; pp. 42-50.
21. MORRILL, John. ‘The English, the Scot s, and the dilemmas of union’, in SMOUT, ed., 
Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900; pp. 57-74.
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It took two brutal shocks to disabuse the Scottish nobility of their error. 
The first was English military conquest by Cromwell’s army, a process complete 
by 1651. The second was the experience of life in Scotland during the three 
years 1649-51, when the Presbyterian clergy were sufficiently confident of their 
power to subject even the nobility to their discipline, threatening the social hier-
archy. It required the humiliation of Cromwell’s conquest to bring this –arguably 
even greater– humiliation to an end. A year later the English parliament offered 
to ‘negotiate’ a different form of union with the Scot s, based on a union of 
parliament s. It was an offer the Scot s could hardly refuse –and which therefore 
only a few would openly embrace during the life of the republic. But the accom-
panying offer of free trade, along with measures by the Cromwellian regime in 
Scotland to check the power of the clergy, gave this model of union distinct 
retrospective attractions. When union was again mooted, in 1670, and the 
two Privy Councils began short-lived negotiations, the assumed starting-point 
was parliamentary union in return for free trade. Despite the return of excluded 
or exiled Presbyterian clergy in 1687-88, the same was true for those who 
canvassed closer union after the Revolution; even Andrew Fletcher, it seems, 
momentarily thought in terms of a union of parliament s22.
By the time the union debate of 1703-1707 got under way, therefore, there 
were two models of Anglo-Scottish union with seventeenth-century antecedent s. 
One was derived from the Limitations and the ideal of an equal union of crowns 
championed by the Covenanters in the 1640s. Fletcher’s proposed Limitations 
were clearly modelled on those which had been imposed on Charles I in 1641, 
though he distanced himself as far as he could from the ‘peevish, imprudent, 
and detestable conduct’ of the Presbyterians who had supported them. Within 
and beyond parliament Fletcher presented the Limitations as part of a wider 
programme of political and constitutional (as well as economic and social) 
reform, designed to re-order the Scottish political community, and reconsti-
tute the existing union on a confederal basis23. This model of confederal or 
‘federal’ union (the terms were used interchangeably) was further elaborated 
by the London-Scot James Hodges, in a series of pamphlet s devoted to The 
Right s and Interest s of the Two British Monarchies…with a special respect to 
an United or Separate State (1703, with a further instalment in 1706). Hodges 
made repeated effort s to define more exactly what a confederal union would 
involve, drawing on the example of the existing Dutch and Swiss confederations. 
Perhaps tellingly, however, he never published the promised pamphlet setting 
out a detailed proposal for a federal union of Scotland and England24.
22. WHATLEY. The Scot s and the Union; pp. 90-92; ROBERT SON, ‘Fletcher, Andrew’, ODNB.
23. FERGUSON, William. Scotland’s Relations with England: a Survey to 1707, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1977; p. 209; FLETCHER. ‘Speeches’, in Political Works; p. 135, with 
the Limitations on pp. 137-40; and see ROBERT SON, John. ‘Andrew Fletcher’s vision of union’, 
in MASON, Roger A. (ed.). Scotland and England 1286-1815, Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987; pp. 
203-25.
24. HODGES, James. The Right s and Interest s of the Two British Monarchies, Inquir’d into, and 
Clear’d; with a special respect to an United or Separate State. Treatise I, London, 1703, Treatise III, 
London 1706; see ROBERT SON, John. ‘An elusive sovereignty. The course of the Union debate in 
Scotland 1698-1707’, in ROBERT SON (ed.). A Union for Empire; pp. 206-7, 213-17. 
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The other available model was that of an incorporating union of the 
crowns and parliament s of the two kingdoms. This would ‘incorporate’ 
Scotland and England as one body politic, consisting of one crown and one 
parliament, which would together make law for the subject s who inhabited 
their territories, and these subject s would be free to trade without restric-
tion among themselves. The language of ‘incorporation’ had been of the 
utmost importance to James VI and I, who had a horror of being thought the 
head of a divided and monstrous body, or the polygamous husband of two 
wives25. But by 1707 the content of the term had been much more precisely 
defined than it was at the start of the Union of the Crowns. It now specifi-
cally included a union of parliament s, while excluding the different systems 
of private law in the two kingdoms, as well as their different forms of church 
government. It was of course this model of union which triumphed in 1707, 
for increasingly obvious political reasons26.
It is not the political obviousness of the outcome of the negotiations 
in 1707 which I would emphasise, however, so much as the rigidity of the 
choice which the Scot s found themselves facing. In part, I have suggested, 
this was of their own making, the choice deriving from the two models of 
union elaborated in the seventeenth century, and forged during the years of 
Scottish Presbyterian aggression in the 1640s, followed by military defeat at 
the hands of Cromwell in the 1650s. But the rigidity of the choice facing the 
Scot s was also a reflection of a wider inflexibility in European thinking about 
forms of union. On the one hand was an idea of confederal union as a union 
of equal, individually sovereign states. This idea was embodied in the United 
Provinces –or ‘States’, as they were known– of the Netherlands, and was 
conceptualised by the jurist s, notably Samuel Pufendorf and Ulrich Huber, 
under the rubric ‘systems of states’. Such a ‘system’, the jurist s insisted, 
was viable if the parties to the league or union (foedus) each possessed sov-
ereignty, and were thus equally independent, for dependency was the mark of 
a ‘province’27. It was thus very difficult to conceive of a union in which there 
were inequalities of power, or layers of authority. Europe might offer a par-
ticularly impressive example of such an unequal, layered union, in the form 
of the Holy Roman Empire, which had been given a new lease of life by the 
Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. But the jurist s could make no sense of even 
the reconstituted Empire as a union. If Pufendorf later regretted his likening 
of it s constitution to a ‘monster’, the Empire remained an anomaly, under-
25. ‘A Speech on the xix day of March 1603/4’, McILWAIN. Political Works of James I; p. 272.
26. On the incorporating unionist case, ROBERT SON. ‘An elusive sovereignty’; pp. 220-22; 
the most up-to-date account of the passing of the Union is WHATLEY. The Scot s and the Union, 
chs 5-9.
27. PUFENDORF, Samuel. De Jure Naturae et Gentium (1672), transl. as Of the Law of Na-
ture and Nations, London, 1703, Bk. VII, Ch. V, Sect. 16-21; see ROBERT SON, John. ‘Empire 
and union: two concept s of the early modern European political order’, and MOORE, James; SIL-
VERTHORNE, Michael. ‘Protestant theologies, limited sovereignties: natural law and conditions 
of union in the German Empire, the Netherlands and Great Britain’, both in ROBERT SON (ed.). A 
Union for Empire; pp. 26-9, 171-97.
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standable only in terms of it s own system of Public Law, or Reichsrecht28. It 
would be almost another 140 years before two unusually imaginative political 
theorist s, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, dared to draw a distinc-
tion between ‘confederal’ and ‘federal’ unions, and broke free of the rigid 
model of confederation with which those Scot s opposed to an incorporating 
union of parliament s were obliged to work29.
For it s part, the model of incorporating union which triumphed in 1707 
was also open to the charge of inflexibility. There was more than a trace of 
Hobbes’ Leviathan to the outcome envisaged by the incorporating unionist s. 
In the first place, incorporation meant that there would be a single, sovereign 
crown-in-parliament with an absolute power to make public law; if in future 
it s will was defied, and the Scot s sought to secede from the Union, there 
was little doubt that the new state would seek to re-impose it s authority by 
conquest, after the example of Cromwell in 1651. Moreover the incorporating 
unionist s were confident that both the old Scottish parliament and the new 
incorporated British parliament were ‘representative’ in the Hobbesian sense; 
that is, full sovereign power lay in parliament as a representative body. The 
exercise of parliamentary authority in no wise depended on reference back to 
the ‘freeholders’, still less to the people in general30.
Critics of incorporating union did their best to exploit these implications, 
just as it s advocates seized on the weaknesses of the confederal alternative. 
The ensuing pamphlet debate was not only of intellectual interest; it mattered 
politically, not least since ‘public opinion’ played a greater role in the political 
process than the ruling elite may have anticipated31. Of the two sides, how-
ever, the incorporating unionist s were better at defusing the objections to 
their model of union. They did so in two ways. 
One was to emphasise that before it became embodied in Act s of the 
Scottish and English parliament s, the Union had been negotiated as a ‘treaty’ 
between the two kingdoms. If any ‘fundamentals’ of the Union were broken, 
the treaty, as a form of contract, might be regarded as void. This conception 
of the Union as a treaty was most enthusiastically advanced by the English 
pamphleteer Daniel Defoe, who was paid by the Crown to go up to Scotland 
28. [PUFENDORF, Samuel], alias Severinus da Monzambano. De Statu Imperii Germanici 
(1667), transl. as The Present State of Germany, London, 1696; pp. 152-4. See SCHRÖDER, 
Peter. ‘The constitution of the Holy Roman Empire after 1648: Samuel Pufendorf’s assessment in 
his Monzambano’, In: Historical Journal, 42, 1999; pp. 961-83.
29. HAMILTON, Alexander; MADISON, James; JAY, John. The Federalist or, the New Constitu-
tion (1787-88), ed. Max Beloff, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948.
30. On the Hobbesian character of incorporating union: ROBERT SON, John. ‘The idea of sov-
ereignty and the Act of Union’, in DICKINSON, H. T.; LYNCH, M. (eds.). The Challenge to Westmin-
ster. Sovereignty, Devolution and Independence, East Linton: John Tuckwell, 2000; pp. 32-41.
31. BOWIE, Karin. Scottish Public Opinion and the Anglo-Scottish Union 1699-1707, Wood-
bridge: Boydell and Brewer for the Royal Historical Society, 2007, opens up a new, hitherto ne-
glected dimension of the Union debate.
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to argue the Unionist case. The argument was intended above all to reassure 
those who feared that the hard-won independence of the Scottish Kirk might 
still be compromised by the strength of the Anglican interest in the united 
British parliament32. That it s proponent s offered no mechanism by which a 
breach of the treaty of Union might be tested –there was no thought of creat-
ing a Public Law of Union after the example of Imperial Reichsrecht– did not 
undermine the effectiveness of the suggestion: the idea that the Union was a 
‘treaty’ deflected attention away from the absolutist implications of the incor-
porating unionist s’ doctrine of sovereignty.
Equally persuasive was the incorporating unionist s’ insistence that sover-
eignty it self was of purely formal significance; what mattered was the ‘utility’ 
which would result from the Union. A single, common parliament of Great Britain 
would not only be able to secure free trade for Scottish merchant s throughout 
the territories under it s jurisdiction, including it s colonies overseas. It would 
also check the exercise of noble power, not least by attracting the greatest 
nobles to London, leaving Scotland it self to be governed by it s lairds, or lesser 
nobility, and their relations in the legal profession. Moreover if the nobility’s sur-
viving legal privileges, such as their retention of ‘heritable jurisdictions’, were 
found to be contrary to ‘the evident utility of the subject s’, they might be abol-
ished, notwithstanding the general intention to preserve Scot s Private law33. 
Finally, incorporating union would guarantee the legal establishment of not one 
but two Protestant Churches, the Anglican and the Presbyterian, on the basis 
of civil rather than divine right. To a laity still smarting from it s treatment at the 
hands of the clergy during the Civil Wars, and reminded of their abiding capacity 
for intolerance as recently as 1696-7, by a spate of witchcraft persecutions of 
as well as by the summary trial and execution of the young ‘atheist’, Thomas 
Aikenhead, the prospect of an Erastian ecclesiastical settlement may have 
been the most attractive of all the Union’s ‘utilities’. 
The ‘success’ of the case for incorporating union may be measured not 
only in the outcome of the debate between 1703 and 1707, an outcome to 
which there were many other, more political contributions. It may also be 
reflected in the Union’s longevity. A Union founded on the assumption that it 
was (once) a ‘treaty’, and therefore cannot be altered in it s most fundamental 
articles without dissolving it, and which has always emphasised that it s value 
lies in the benefit s it brings to both the Scot s and the English, may expect 
to last only so long as it continues to satisfy these expectations. That it has 
now lasted for three hundred years suggest s that the terms in which it was 
presented, and the ‘utilities’ which were claimed for it, were not ill-chosen.
32. DEFOE, Daniel. An Essay at Removing National Prejudices Against a Union with England, 
Part III, [Edinburgh], 1706; see ROBERT SON. ‘An elusive sovereignty’; pp. 223-4.
33. ‘Treaty of Union’, Article XVIII, in PRYDE, Gordon S. The Treaty of Union of Scotland and 
England 1707, Edinburgh and London: Nelson, 1950; p. 95. On the significance of the issue of 
heritable jurisdictions, and their eventual abolition in 1747, see KIDD, Colin. ‘Eighteenth-century 
Scotland and the three unions’, in SMOUT (ed.). Anglo-Scottish Relations from 1603 to 1900; 
pp. 171-87.
